ph-risk-intelligence-research

Philippine Counterterrorism 2016–2026

From Marawi to Maritime Defense: A Decade of Strategic Evolution

Manila, Philippines – February 12, 2026

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Over the past decade, the Philippine counterterrorism landscape has undergone a fundamental transformation—from containing kinetic insurgency to managing hybrid, networked, and digitally influenced threats. This report, based on comprehensive analysis of Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) operations, Congressional Research Service assessments, and independent security research, examines critical lessons learned and identifies structural imperatives for the next phase of national security.

Key Finding: While large-scale territorial ambitions of terrorist organizations have been decisively defeated, adaptive decentralized threats persist, demanding an evolutionary shift from reactive suppression to anticipatory intelligence architecture.

I. STRATEGIC CONTEXT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF EXTREMISM

The Numbers Tell the Story

The Philippine Armed Forces has achieved measurable success in degrading organized terrorist capability:

Sources: Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine News Agency (December 2025); Congressional Research Service Report IF10250 (February 2025)

Abu Sayyaf Group: From Peak Threat to Organizational Collapse

The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States in 1997, experienced systematic dismantlement:

Sources: The Soufan Center (May 2025); Wikipedia (Abu Sayyaf); US State Department Country Reports on Terrorism 2023

Bangsamoro Peace Process: A Counter-Narrative to Violence

The establishment of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) in 2019 created unprecedented conditions for demobilization:

Sources: Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process; The Soufan Center (March 2025)

II. THE MARAWI CRUCIBLE: LESSONS FROM THE PHILIPPINES’ LONGEST BATTLE

Strategic Intelligence Failure and Tactical Adaptation

The five-month Siege of Marawi (May 23–October 23, 2017) exposed critical vulnerabilities while demonstrating operational resilience:

The Intelligence Gap:

Human Cost:

Physical Destruction:

Sources: Modern War Institute at West Point (May 2024); Australian Strategic Policy Institute (April 2025); Amnesty International; Asian Development Bank Emergency Assistance Report

The Economic Toll

The Asian Development Bank’s Post-Conflict Needs Assessment calculated total recovery requirements:

Reconstruction Reality Check:

Sources: Asian Development Bank RRP PHI 52313; NPR (October 2020); The New Humanitarian (March 2023); DFAT Marawi Recovery Project Mid-Term Review

Tactical Innovation: The Tear Gas Success Story

Unlike Western militaries bound by chemical weapons restrictions in warfare, the AFP’s use of tear gas provided a critical non-lethal option:

Operational Benefits:

Strategic Implication: The battle demonstrated that without effective non-lethal alternatives, even highly trained militaries face binary choices: protracted urban combat or overwhelming firepower with catastrophic humanitarian consequences.

Source: Modern War Institute, Urban Warfare Case Study #8

III. STRUCTURAL LESSONS: WHY TACTICAL SUCCESS DOESN’T GUARANTEE STRATEGIC VICTORY

Lesson 1: Tactical Excellence ≠ Strategic Intelligence Fusion

The AFP’s special operations units have proven highly capable in kinetic engagements. However, persistent institutional challenges remain:

Identified Gaps:

Critical Insight: Future threats will not announce themselves kinetically. They will emerge as pattern anomalies detectable only through integrated intelligence architecture.

Lesson 2: Terror Networks Operate as Adaptive Systems

Decade-long observation reveals consistent adaptation patterns:

When territorial control fails → Groups decentralize into micro-cells

When leadership is neutralized → Recruitment migrates to digital platforms

When financing channels close → Informal alternative routes emerge (maritime smuggling, kidnap-for-ransom, clan-based fundraising)

Strategic Implication: Counterterrorism must evolve from reactive suppression to anticipatory modeling that accounts for organizational plasticity.

Lesson 3: The Philippines’ Archipelagic Geography Is Structural, Not Incidental

The archipelago creates persistent vulnerabilities:

2023-2025 Maritime Response: The AFP conducted 820 maritime and air patrols in the West Philippine Sea in 2023 alone, demonstrating that maritime domain awareness has become a strategic imperative—not an auxiliary capability.

Source: Armed Forces of the Philippines (2023 Year-End Report)

Lesson 4: The Intelligence Gap Is Integration, Not Volume

The Paradox: Signals existed before major escalations. The consistent vulnerability is not lack of raw intelligence—it’s the failure to synthesize disparate data streams into actionable threat assessments.

Required Capabilities:

IV. CURRENT THREAT ASSESSMENT: THE EVOLUTION CONTINUES

ISIS-East Asia: Fragmented but Not Eliminated

Despite organizational degradation, ISIS-aligned elements persist:

Leadership Losses:

Continuing Activity:

Sources: National Counterterrorism Center; The Soufan Center (May 2025); Philippines Security Report (April 2024); U.S. Institute of Peace (April 2024)

The Remnant Threat: Small, Fragmented, Still Dangerous

Active Groups (2024-2025):

Key Characteristic: No single unified ISIS-East Asia leadership structure exists. Instead, loosely connected groups operate in geographic silos with local ethnic recruitment bases.

Strategic Concern: The December 2023 Mindanao State University attack—targeting a campus that remained unbreached during the 2017 Marawi siege—demonstrates intent to reignite conflict and inspire violent resurgence during the sensitive pre-election period.

Source: U.S. Institute of Peace Analysis (April 2024)

V. PREDICTIVE INTELLIGENCE: THREE EMERGING THREAT VECTORS

Vector 1: Micro-Cell Radicalization

Expected Characteristics:

Detection Requirements:

Vector 2: Criminal-Extremist Convergence

Economic instability and regional fragmentation are blurring traditional boundaries:

Hybrid Threat Profile:

Historical Precedent: Abu Sayyaf Group’s evolution from ideological terrorism to profit-driven kidnapping demonstrates this convergence pattern.

Monitoring Imperative: Financial flow analysis and maritime anomaly detection become critical early-warning mechanisms.

Vector 3: Signal Intelligence Evolution

Traditional SIGINT Limitations:

Next-Generation Requirements:

Critical Distinction: Predictive intelligence is not prediction of guilt. It is early identification of risk clusters requiring further investigation.

VI. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION: A FORCE MULTIPLIER

U.S.-Philippines Defense Partnership

2024-2025 Engagement:

U.S. Military Assistance:

Sources: Congressional Research Service Reports IF10250 (multiple editions); U.S. Department of State

Multilateral Maritime Cooperation

2025 Operations:

Strategic Rationale: As AFP shifts focus from internal security to territorial defense (particularly West Philippine Sea tensions with China), maritime interoperability becomes essential.

Regional Counterterrorism Architecture

Philippine Memberships:

Source: U.S. State Department Country Reports on Terrorism 2023

VII. INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS: BUILDING ADAPTIVE CAPACITY

2025 Organizational Restructuring

The AFP implemented major structural reforms to support multi-domain operations:

September 2025: AFP Joint Sustainment Command

October 2025: AFP Strategic Command

November 2025: AFP Civil-Military Operations Command

May 2025: Joint Special Operations Command

February 2025: National Capital Region Command (Reactivated)

Source: Armed Forces of the Philippines (December 2025 statement)

Modernization Acquisitions

2025 Capability Enhancements:

Air Assets:

Naval Assets:

Missile Systems:

Sources: Armed Forces of the Philippines; Congressional Research Service

VIII. THE PREVENTION ARCHITECTURE: BEYOND KINETIC OPERATIONS

Program Against Violent Extremism (PAVE)

Following the death of Abu Sayyaf emir Isnilon Hapilon during Marawi recapture, the Philippine government launched comprehensive reintegration programming:

PAVE Components:

Documented Impact:

Source: Institute for the Policy Analysis of Conflict; The Soufan Center (March 2025)

National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

Multi-Stakeholder Approach:

Localized Strategy Rationale: Different localities respond to different incentives. National-level programs lack granular understanding of clan dynamics, economic grievances, and social networks.

Critical Insight from Indonesia-Philippines Comparative Analysis: “The greatest gains come from investments in local institutions: the family, the mosque, or the neighborhood. Directing funds to a wife to pay for children’s school fees can build rapport with a prisoner. Disrupting pro-ISIS study sessions in a mosque can end, or at least reduce, ISIS recruitment at that venue.”

Source: Institute for International Peacebuilding; The Soufan Center

Surrenderee Motivation Research

Academic research by Najwa Indanan Unga identified key factors driving demobilization:

Primary Reasons for Surrender:

Policy Implication: Effective disengagement programming must address both “push factors” (making militancy untenable) and “pull factors” (making civilian reintegration attractive).

IX. STRATEGIC INFLECTION POINT: 2025 BARMM ELECTIONS

The Fragile Peace

The May 2025 Bangsamoro Autonomous Region parliamentary elections represent a critical juncture:

Best Case Scenario:

Worst Case Scenario:

Cascading Strategic Consequences: If Bangsamoro peace fails, Manila would be forced to:

Source: U.S. Institute of Peace (April 2024)

X. THE NEXT DECADE: FROM REACTIVE TO PREDICTIVE

The Architecture of Anticipatory Intelligence

Future counterterrorism effectiveness depends on six foundational capabilities:

1. Unified Data Fusion Platforms

2. Graph-Based Network Analysis

3. Transparent Risk Scoring Models

4. Embedded Civil Liberty Guardrails

5. Maritime Anomaly Analytics

6. Financial Flow Pattern Detection

Technology + Human Judgment

Critical Principle: Technology alone will not solve terrorism. Structured intelligence systems reduce blind spots, but human analysis remains essential for:

XI. COMPARATIVE REGIONAL CONTEXT

Indonesia:

Malaysia:

Regional Lesson: Even as major terrorist organizations disband or decline, remnant cells and quasi-independent actors retain attack capability. Sustained vigilance and regional cooperation remain imperative.

Source: The Soufan Center (July 2024)

XII. CONCLUSION: OPERATIONAL COURAGE MEETS ANALYTICAL ARCHITECTURE

What the Decade Has Proven

Tactical Achievements:

Persistent Challenges:

The Defining Question for 2026–2036

The next decade will not be defined by another Marawi-scale territorial seizure.

It will be defined by a single question:

Will Philippine intelligence systems evolve from reactive to predictive?

Predictive ≠ Intrusive

Predictive intelligence is not:

Predictive intelligence is:

The Next Frontier

The Philippines has demonstrated operational courage through:

The next frontier is analytical architecture:

Final Assessment

Technology will not solve terrorism.

But integrated, transparent, legally constrained intelligence architecture reduces catastrophic blind spots.

The Philippines stands at an inflection point where past tactical success can be consolidated into strategic resilience—or where fragmented systems allow adaptive threats to mutate beyond institutional response capacity.

The choice between these futures is being made today.

SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY

This report synthesizes data from:

Government Sources:

International Organizations:

Independent Research Institutions:

Media and NGO Documentation:

Methodology Note: All quantitative claims are cross-referenced with at least two independent sources. Casualty figures reflect ranges where official statistics diverge.

Contact Information: For inquiries regarding this report, please contact appropriate Philippine government security communications offices.

Disclaimer: This document is prepared as independent analysis for public information purposes. It does not represent official government policy and should not be construed as such.

END OF REPORT

Koleen Paunon

Document prepared: February 12, 2026

Classification: Unclassified / Public Domain